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INTRODUCTION 
 In June of 2013, former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden leaked a 
multitude of classified documents that revealed just how much the government knows about the 
American people.1 It knows more than most anyone thought.2 The revelations started a rigorous 
debate on how much information the government should gather and the manner in which they 
gather it,3 all in the age of smartphones, social media, and data brokers. The Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution, which protects Americans against unreasonable searches and seizures, is one 
of the centers in this debate.4 The modern Fourth Amendment test centers on the reasonableness 
of a person’s subjective expectations of privacy.5 The digital age and the amount of personal 
information shared in today’s world, both willingly and unwillingly, puts the usefulness of this 
test into question.6 After the Snowden leaks, society at large knows that the government is in on 
the game on an astonishing scale. The reasonable expectation of privacy test will soon fail to 
protect a sphere of individual privacy,7 and the Fourth Amendment test must be reshaped with 
those concerns in mind. This note suggests an overall factual inquiry independent of privacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 
5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order/. 
2 See id. (“[T]his is the first time significant and top-secret documents have revealed the continuation of the practice 
on a massive scale under President Obama.”). 
3 See Spencer Ackerman, Obama Formally Proposes End to NSA's Bulk Collection of Telephone Data, THE 
GUARDIAN (March 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/obama-proposes-end-nsa-bulk-data-
collection. In 2014, debate for reform included proposals from members of Congress, outside privacy advocacy 
groups, and private communications companies. Id.  
4 See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorg, The Spirit of the Fourth Amendment – and the NSA’s Disregard For It, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/the-spirit-of-the-fourth-
amendment-and-the-nsas-disregard-for-it/284498/.  
5 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-55 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
6 See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION 30-34 (2014) (detailing who collects data and with whom they share 
it). 
7 See infra Section IV.A.	  
expectations, as well as an abolishment of the third party doctrine and a strengthening of digital 
privacy laws.8  
 Part I of this paper discusses Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including the traditional 
test, the modern test, the third party doctrine, and recent rulings in cases involving technological 
surveillance. Part II discusses the scope of the National Security Agency internet metadata and 
telephone data surveillance programs. Part III provides an overview of recent rulings on the 
constitutionality of the NSA programs. Part IV suggests possible changes to the Fourth 
Amendment test, including a shift from subjective expectations of privacy to a factual analysis, 
and the elimination of the third party doctrine.  
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 The text of the Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” and also requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”9 Approaches to the interpretation of the 
amendment have varied over time, with a shift in the 1960s that gave rise to the modern test.10 
Each Fourth Amendment question requires a two-step analysis: Was the area or interest intruded 
on by the government protected under the Fourth Amendment, and, if so, was the intrusion 
reasonable?11 The search will be reasonable if undertaken pursuant to a warrant supported by 
probable cause or under certain other exceptional circumstances.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See infra Section IV.C.	  
9 U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
10 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); compare to Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 464 
(1928). 
11 ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013). It is important to distinguish 
these two inquiries in the context of mass surveillance. According to one court, “dragnet character doesn’t 
A. Traditional Test: Spheres of Protection 
 A brief examination of the history of the Fourth Amendment is worthwhile when 
discussing traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.13 Although original intent arguments 
can be problematic giving the impossibility of ascertaining the actual intent of the Framers, 
certain fundamental concepts can be drawn from the historical record.14 In England, the issuance 
of general warrants was common, authorizing broad ranges of places to be searched, items to be 
seized, and people to be arrested.15 Colonies including Pennsylvania and Massachusetts had 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibiting warrantless searches or 
seizures and requiring individualized suspicion to search.16 Under the conventional view of the 
Fourth Amendment, the first clause implies that the people have a general right against 
government intrusions and invasions of privacy, and the second clause specified when those 
invasions would be reasonable and permissible.17 This note is concerned mainly with the issue of 
what interests and information are protected by the Fourth Amendment rather than when 
intrusions on those interests are reasonable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
automatically turn it into a search.” Id. If none of the information gathered by the government is protected under the 
Fourth Amendment, it is essentially public and the government may gather it as they see fit. See id.  
12	  Spencer S. Cady, Reconciling Privacy with Progress: Fourth Amendment Protection of E-Mail Stored with and 
Sent Through A Third-Party Internet Service Provider, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 230 (2012). 
13 See generally Thomas Clancy, The Role of History, 7 OHIO ST. J CRIM. L. 811 (2010). 
14 See id. at 813-814 (discussing various histories of the Fourth Amendment and their strengths and weaknesses). 
15 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and 
Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 509 (1995) (discussing English case in which general warrant was issued for libel 
and forty-nine people were arrested). 
16  Id. at 513-14. 
17 Thomas Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 983 
(2011) (quoting  Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 84 JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUDIES IN HIST. AND POL. SCI. 1, 19 (1966)) (“The first clause—“[t]he right 
of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”—recognized as 
already existing a right to freedom from arbitrary governmental  invasion of privacy and did not seek to create or 
confer such a right. It was evidently meant to re-emphasize (and, in some undefined way, strengthen) the 
requirements for a valid warrant set forth in the second clause. The second clause, in turn, defines and interprets the 
first, telling us the kind of search that is not “unreasonable,” and therefore not forbidden, namely, the one carried out 
under the safeguards there specified.”). 
 Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment was thought to protect certain physical areas, and 
some significant remnants of that line of thought endure.18 The home was, and still is, generally 
entitled to the highest level of protection,19 while some areas, such as open fields, are entitled to 
no protection at all.20 Still others have an intermediate protection, such as the automobile,21 and 
the curtilage or area immediately surrounding the home.22 Significant developments in traditional 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence came in the Prohibition-era cases of Olmstead v. United 
States23 and Carroll v. United States.24 In Olmstead, officers used wiretaps to intercept telephone 
messages, without a warrant, to discover and gather evidence regarding a massive bootlegging 
operation.25 The Court found that this kind of wiretapping was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment protects “a man's house, his person, 
his papers, and his effects” in the physical and material sense only.26 Since the telephone wires 
were not part of the defendant’s home, the Fourth Amendment could not be extended to protect 
telephone communications.27 
 Carroll involved technology in a different way – it established the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement, based in part on its unique mobility.28 At the same time, the Court in 
Carroll noted that “The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed 
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States. 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (holding that the warrantless use, from outside the home, 
of an infrared radiation detector to detect the heat of marijuana grow lamps inside the home unconstitutional). 
19	  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.  
20 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (holding that the open fields doctrine, which dictates that 
there is no protected Fourth Amendment interest in an open field, was not overruled by Katz). 
21 See Carroll, 132 U.S. at 162.  
22 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.  
23 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
24 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
25 Id. at 456-457. 
26 Id. at 464.  
27	  Id.	  	  
28 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).  
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”29 The Court in Carroll 
recognized that when applying Fourth Amendment principles to novel, life-changing 
technologies such as the automobile, which fundamentally changed the character of everyday life 
for Americans, the public interest should be considered because the intent of the Framers cannot 
be determinative when dealing with such novel technology.30 It also demonstrates the general 
approach frequently taken by the Court before the formation of the modern test: using historical 
principles as a general guide without allowing the constraints of history to inhibit adaptation to 
changes in society.31 
B. Modern Test: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 The modern Fourth Amendment test originated in Katz v. United States, when the Court 
held that the use of an eavesdropping and recording device on the exterior of a phone booth was 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.32 Katz marked a fundamental shift in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.33 Previously, courts focused on the areas protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, with a particular emphasis on the home as the epitome of the private 
sphere.34  The government argued that since the use of the listening device required no physical 
intrusion into the phone booth, which may be considered the constitutionally protected area, its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id. at 150.  
30 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 182 (2002) 
(discussing the reliance of Justices Scalia on Thomas on the Carroll majority opinion.) Sklansky criticizes both 
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas for ignoring the portion of the Carroll opinion which states that the Fourth 
Amendment should also protect “public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.” Id.  
31	  See id. at 165. “Before Katz, history was a dominant theme of search-and-seizure jurisprudence generally--but 
usually history was consulted to shed light on the central concerns of the Fourth Amendment, not to locate its 
precise commands.” Id.  
32 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  
33 See Mina Ford, The Whole World Contained: How the Ubiquitous Use of Mobile Phones Undermines Your Right 
to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (2012). 
34 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-353. See also id. at 367 (Black, J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment was aimed 
directly at the abhorred practice of breaking in, ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing 
people's personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates.”). 
use could not be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.35 The Court responded with the oft-
repeated recognition that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”36 
 It was Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, however, that began to flesh out the 
conceptual foundation of the new Fourth Amendment test.37 Harlan’s concurrence laid out the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard.38 Under this standard, Fourth Amendment 
protections will apply when “a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, [when] the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”39 The concurrence contrasted Katz’s phone booth with an open field, which the 
Court had long ago found entitled to no Fourth Amendment protection, noting that there could be 
no reasonable expectation in privacy in an open field.40 The “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
language appeared just one year later in 1967 in Terry v. Ohio, another noteworthy Fourth 
Amendment case which established the legality of a limited weapons search based on a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.41 
 Katz itself was born out of new technology, although primitive by today’s standards. In 
the late 1970s, the Court again confronted the intersection of a new technology and the Fourth 
Amendment in Smith v. Maryland - this time it was a “pen register,” which recorded the numbers 
dialed from the defendant’s telephone.42 Police installed the pen register at the central office of 
the telephone company without a warrant, after a woman who had been robbed began receiving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Id. at 349.  
36 Id. at 351.  
37 See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections in terms of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”).  
38 Id. 
39 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (internal quotation omitted). 
40 Id. See also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 9 (1968).  
42 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).   
obscene phone calls.43 The Court applied the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, finding 
that the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his 
telephone.44 The Court noted that pen registers were commonly used in telephone company 
billing operations and other business purposes along with law enforcement purposes.45 It also 
reaffirmed that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties,” a proposition known as the “third-party doctrine.”46 
 In 2011, the Supreme Court considered some of the most advanced and problematic 
technology yet: Global Positing Systems, which allows law enforcement to pinpoint the location 
of the device within 50 to 100 feet with minimal cost and effort.47 In United States v. Jones, 
officers installed a GPS device on a vehicle used by a suspected cocaine distributor and tracked 
his movements for 28 days.48 This surveillance generated over 2,000 pages of data on the 
defendant’s whereabouts.49 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, analyzed the alleged illegal 
intrusion not under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, but under a property-based 
theory.50 In rejecting the government’s argument that the GPS device captured only the location 
of the vehicle on public streets, Justice Scalia focused on the trespass in which the government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Id.   
44 Id. at 742.  
45 Id.    
46 Id. at 744. The Court also stated that a person who discloses information to a third party assumes the risk that this 
information will eventually be turned over to the government for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 743.  
47 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). Global Positioning Systems use triangulation between ground-
level user devices and 24 orbiting satellites to pinpoint velocity and time as well as location. See UNITED STATES 
AIR FORCE, GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM FACT SHEET (Sepl. 15, 2010), 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104610/global-positioning-system.aspx (last 
accessed Feb. 26, 2014).  
48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
49 Id.  
50 See id. at 949 (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied 
private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).  
engaged by placing the device on the vehicle, and dismissed the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard as non-exclusive.51 
 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones highlighted the problems with using a trespass 
framework to analyze technological intrusions on privacy.52 Justice Sotomayor joined the 
majority opinion because for her, Justice Scalia’s trespass framework constitutes “an irreducible 
constitutional minimum.”53 The concurrence, however, noted that not all technological 
surveillance requires trespass – even the same kind of GPS monitoring undertaken in Jones could 
soon be done using smartphones or factory-installed GPS devices, with no physical trespass 
necessary.54 The opinion also noted that these helpful but intrusive technologies are 
fundamentally reshaping societal expectations of privacy.55 Sotomayor further suggested that 
perhaps the time has come to abolish the third-party doctrine altogether, because of the great 
quantity of deeply personal information revealed to third parties through technology on a regular 
basis.56 
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DATA COLLECTION PROGRAMS 
A. Leaks 
 In June of 2009, The Guardian, a British newspaper, began publishing anonymous reports 
of bulk data collection programs undertaken by the National Security Agency in the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See id. at 952 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test.” (emphasis in original)).  
52 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56	  Id.	  	  
States.57 The newspaper initially revealed that the NSA was collecting phone records from 
customers of the telecommunications giant Verizon, regardless of any suspicion of wrongdoing 
or criminal activity.58 The leaker (or whistleblower) turned out to be Edward Snowden, a 
contractor who had formerly worked with the National Security Agency.59 Soon after his 
identification, Snowden was charged with espionage and is now in Russia, seeking asylum in 
Europe.60 Snowden had access to an estimated 1.7 million documents, and months after the 
revelations it is still unclear which documents he actually downloaded and shared with the 
media.61 Snowden clearly has an agenda, as evidenced by his comments in a January 2014 
interview:  
Every time you pick up the phone, dial a number, write an e-mail, make a 
purchase, travel on the bus carrying a cellphone, swipe a card somewhere, you 
leave a trace and the government has decided that it’s a good idea to collect it all, 
everything, even if you’ve never been suspected of any crime.62 
 
 The government eventually acknowledged the existence of the collection 
programs, although many documents remain classified.63 The procedure by which the 
data collection is authorized is as follows: the Federal Bureau of Investigation seeks an 
order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court directing, in the case of telephone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Scott Neuman, Newspaper Reveals Source for NSA Surveillance Stories, THE TWO-WAY, NPR.ORG (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/09/190121734/newspaper-reveals-source-for-nsa-surveillance-
stories. 
58 Greenwald, supra note 1. 
59 Id.  
60 Eyder Peralta, Edward Snowden Tells EU Parliament He Wants Asylum in Europe, NPR.COM (March 7, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/07/287459845/edward-snowden-tells-eu-parliament-he-wants-
asylum-in-europe. Snowden was nominated for Nobel Peace Prize in 2014. Bill Chappel, Edward Snowden 
Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize (Jan. 29, 2014), THE TWO-WAY, NPR.COM, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2014/01/29/268421741/edward-snowden-is-nominated-for-the-nobel-peace-prize. 
61 Walter Pincus, Critics of Government Surveillance Aren’t Backing Off Despite Recent Developments, FINE PRINT, 
WASHINGTON POST (February 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/critics-of-
government-surveillance-arent-backing-off-despite-recent-developments/2014/02/10/04828cf8-8f6b-11e3-b227-
12a45d109e03_story.html. 
62 Id.  
63 See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13–0881, 2013 WL 6598728, *2 & *2 n. 9 (D.D.C. 2013). 
data, telecommunications providers to turn over all “telephony metadata” available.64 In 
the case of internet metadata, the order is directed at internet communications companies 
such as Google or Apple.65  
 The legal mechanism that allows for this data collection is also largely secret.66 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is an Article III court created in 1978 by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was passed as a response to discoveries that 
warrantless electronic surveillance was being used (and abused) for national security 
purposes.67 After September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act amended the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to allow the FBI to obtain orders “requiring the production 
of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for 
an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States 
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities.”68 The full details of the FISC procedure is outside the scope of this paper, but 
it is important to note that all petitions, records of proceedings, and orders from the court 
are to be kept from public view.69 
B. Telephone metadata 
 The National Security Agency, beginning in 2006, has conducted a dragnet data 
collection program in which they collect telephone company records of calls for all land-line and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. at *2.  
65	  Spencer Ackerman, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Yahoo Release US Surveillance Requests, THE GUARDIAN 
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  See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1861(f)(4)-(5) (2006 & Supp. 2012).	  
67 See Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, *3; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(3), 1805(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2012). The Foreign 
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intelligence activities.” Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *3 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)).  
69 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1861(f)(4)-(5),  
some cellular telephones in the United States.70 These records reveal the number making the call, 
the number receiving the call, and the length of the call.71 The NSA cannot, however, 
immediately access the data it collects.72 In order for the NSA to make a query to search for 
information in its massive collection, it must “[identify] a known telephone number for which, 
based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
telephone number is associated with [redacted].”73 This “reasonable suspicion” language 
originates from the Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, and is a lesser showing than probable 
cause.74 The NSA holds the collected data for five years.75 The massive domestic telephone 
metadata program is not the limit of the NSA’s technological capacity for data-gathering – in 
spring of 2014, the Washington Post reported that the NSA has the technological capability to 
record and store for 30 days all phone traffic (including the content of entire telephone 
conversations, not just metadata) of an unnamed foreign country.76 
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71 Id. See also In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted], Order at 2, Docket No. BR 06-05 (F.I.S.C. May 24, 2006), available at 
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72 2 Law of Electronic Surveillance § 9:68. 
73 Id. (quoting In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of 
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76 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches ‘Into the Past’ to Retrieve, Replay 
Phone Calls, THE WASHINGTON POST (March 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-
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C. Internet metadata 
 Even more troublesome than the NSA’s wholesale telephone record collection program is 
its internet metadata collection program. Internet metadata is information produced when one 
does almost anything online, from checking email to visiting a social network.77 This data 
contains an astonishing amount of detailed information about how we spend our daily lives and 
our personal characteristics, including highly private aspects of life.78 For example, whenever an 
email is sent, the metadata it generates contains name and email of both the sender and recipient, 
IP address of the sender, date, time, time zone, the subject of the email, and a unique identifier of 
each email.79 When Americans use a search engine, which many of us do multiple times per day, 
the metadata contains the search query, the search results, and the pages visited as a result of the 
search.80 Email and search history alone can reveal an incredible detailed picture of how people 
spend their day, their health, and their personal problems.81 One commentator noted that internet 
metadata is “a way of getting inside your head that's in many ways on par with reading your 
diary.”82 It is worth noting here that this information was being recorded and used by private 
companies well before it was revealed that the government was also collecting the information.83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The Guardian Guide to your Metadata, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/interactive/2013/jun/12/what-is-metadata-nsa-surveillance#meta=1000000. 
78 See id.  
79 Id. In 2013, the FBI traced the affair of General David Patreus and Paula Broadwell using metadata from the 
anonymous email account they shared. Id. Instead of sending emails, the two saved drafts to communicate – but the 
government still had enough information from the metadata to connect the dots between them. Id.  
80 Id.  
81 ANGWIN, supra note 6, at 1-20. 
82 Glen Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman, NSA Collected US Email Records in Bulk for More Than Two Years 
under Obama, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-
data-mining-authorised-obama (“The calls you make can reveal a lot, but now that so much of our lives are mediated 
by the internet, your IP [internet protocol] logs are really a real-time map of your brain . . .” said Julian Sanchez of 
the Cato Institute.”). 
83 For an excellent explanation of data collection and targeted advertising, see Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother 
Gets A Makeover: Behavioral Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 560-67 (2012). 
An entire industry of companies tracks online consumer data and sells it to marketers to use to 
target marketing to individual consumers based on their internet browsing history.84 
 Updated news on the scope of data collection is reported frequently.85 For example, as 
late as February 2014, leaked documents revealed in addition to its domestic surveillance 
programs, the NSA helped British intelligence agencies capture images from the video calls of 
ordinary British citizens, including sexually explicit images.86 The NSA has also worked on 
circumventing the data encryption system that protects everything from credit card transactions 
to medical records, going so far as to work with private companies, some of whom insert a “back 
door” for the government as they develop encryption techniques.87 The Obama Administration 
originally asserted that the main NSA internet metadata program was discontinued in 2011,88 but 
it was then reported that the NSA’s capacity for collecting internet data had actually increased 
since then.89  
III. RECENT CHALLENGES TO NSA BULK DATA COLLECTION PROGRAMS 
 Challenges to NSA dragnet data collection programs began soon after the NSA programs 
became public knowledge in 2013.90 Although these cases are still in the early stages of 
litigation,91 the district court decisions currently available demonstrate the approaches courts 
have taken thus far, and shed light on how the Supreme Court may eventually interpret the issue 
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85 See, e.g., Mark Memmott, Latest Leak: U.K. Spied On Webchats, Grabbed Millions Of Images, THE TWO-WAY, 
NPR.COM, February 27, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/02/27/283473563/latest-leak-u-k-spied-
on-webchats-grabbed-millions-of-images.  
86 See id. 
87 Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson and Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Privacy Safeguards on Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2013, at A1.  
88 Greenwald & Ackerman, supra note 82.  
89 Glen Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA is Still Harvesting Your Online Data, THE GUARDIAN, 
June 27, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection. 
90 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, No. 13–0881, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. 2013). 
91 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The 
initial substantive opinion in ACLU v. Clapper was issued on December 27, 2013. See id.  
of bulk domestic surveillance through technology.92 In addition to the formal legal challenges in 
the works, the executive branch is getting into the reform game as well.93 In March of 2014, 
President Obama announced his intention to get rid of the current telephone metadata programs 
and replace it.94 The designers of any new surveillance program will have to be mindful of the 
progress of two recent cases in federal court.95 
A. American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper 
 In late 2013, one district court drew on cases involving other types of electronic 
surveillance when it found that the NSA surveillance programs complied with the Fourth 
Amendment.96 In American Civil Liberties Union v.Clapper, the ACLU and other 
organizations97 sought an injunction prohibiting the government from continuing the data 
collection and a declaratory judgment that the collection was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.98 In late 2013, 
the district court judge denied the motion, finding that the collection programs comply with 
Fourth Amendment and the various applicable statutes. 99 In its Fourth Amendment analysis, the 
court applied the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.100 The challengers attempted to 
distinguish Smith, noting that the defendant in Smith was the single target of investigation in that 
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95 See generally Clapper, 2013 WL 6819708; Klayman v. Obama, No. 13–0881, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. 2013).  
96 Id. at *20-21.  
97 Challengers include The American Civil Liberties Foundation, The New York Civil Liberties Union, and the New 
York Civil Liberties Foundation. Id. at *1.  
98 ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 WL 6819708, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013). 
99 Id. at *1. The order began with a narrative about how metadata collection might have prevented the 9/11 attacks 
by tracking one of the hijacker’s phone calls from San Diego to Yemen. Id. at *1.  
100 Id. at *20.  
case.101 Since the Court in Smith found there is no privacy interest in the telephone numbers 
themselves, the ALCU argued that the information that can be gleaned from the telephone 
numbers, such as political association, religion, or personal vices, is entitled to protection.102 The 
district court rejected those arguments, endorsing the procedural safeguards employed by the 
government.103 It found that the data collection was not transformed into a Fourth Amendment 
“search” because of its dragnet character.104 
 The court acknowledged that the way people use their phones is much different than the 
way they used them when Smith was decided, but noted that the way calls are placed – by 
sending information to telecommunications providers – has not changed.105 Notably, the parties 
appeared to be proceeding under the assumption that the programs included all landline and cell 
phone records, although since it has been revealed that the NSA has been unable to keep pace 
with increased cell phone use and collects only some cell records.106 Since the telephone 
metadata challenge still involves the phones’ use as phones, not as mobile datebooks, small 
computers, or any of the myriad things for which we now use our phones, Smith controlled, 
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  Id. at *22; Nakashima, supra note 70. The NSA is still trying to keep pace with technological developments and 
collects more call records, however. Id. (“The NSA is preparing to seek court orders to compel wireless companies 
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according to the court.107 The court also explicitly rejected the ACLU’s argument based on the 
Jones concurring opinions.108 
B. Klayman v. Obama 
 The district court for the District of Columbia reached the opposite result in Klayman v. 
Obama, where five individual plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the government 
from collecting their phone records or querying the government’s data collection using their 
phone numbers, and asking the government to destroy all information collected about to the 
plaintiffs thus far.109 The court granted the preliminary injunction based on the plaintiff’s 
constitutional claims, but stayed the order pending appeal because of “the significant national 
security interests at stake . . . and the novelty of the constitutional issues . . . .”110 Interestingly, in 
Klayman, the court stated that violations of the Fourth Amendment occur either when the 
government commits a physical intrusion, citing Jones, or if the government violates the 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, citing Katz, although the court dismissed the idea 
that there was a physical intrusion in the collection of metadata.111 The court started, predictably, 
with a citation to Smith v. Maryland, but soon made the case that it is no longer useful: 
When do present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the 
NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by 
the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a precedent like Smith simply does 
not apply? The answer, unfortunately for the Government, is now.112 
 The court drew on the part of the Jones majority opinion that distinguished the earlier 
United States v. Knotts, by finding that the type of long-term comprehensive surveillance 
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undertaken by the police through GPS monitoring was vastly different from a short-term and 
short-range “beeper” device.113 The main differences, according to the court, include (1) the 
telephone metadata program contains 5 years’ worth of information as opposed to just a few 
days’ worth in Smith,114 the program collected data indiscriminately, creating an unofficial joint 
private-public intelligence program,115 and (3) the technology used to undertake the program was 
unimaginable in 1979 when Smith was decided.116 The court further emphasized the ubiquity of 
cell phones, which is exponentially greater now than in the 1970s or 1980s.117  In Klayman, the 
Court went on to hold that the plaintiffs showed a substantial likelihood that the challenged 
programs were unreasonable.118 
C. Katz and the NSA 
 The early decisions of the District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the 
District of Columbia act as a preview of how courts will rule on the NSA programs, especially 
since more information is being revealed continually.119 Both cases considered only the 
telephone metadata program,120 so it worthwhile exploring how the Katz test may apply to the 
internet metadata program. 
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 1. Phone records 
 The application of Smith v. Maryland, which is based on the Katz standard, to the NSA 
collection of phone records seems fairly straightforward.121 Today’s phone metadata contains 
mostly the same information as the pen register captured in Smith,122 and the metadata is 
revealed to the third party of the phone company so that the call can go through, much like it was 
in the past.123 There are some key differences in today’s phone metadata and the information 
recorded by Smith’s pen register – the information is stored indefinitely as opposed to being used 
for a limited criminal investigation.124 The other key distinction between Smith and the current 
NSA measures is the nature of the collection. In Smith, the pen register was collected from one 
person who was suspected of committing a crime, although there was still no warrant.125 The 
NSA programs are en mass, without suspicion, and also stored for years unlike the limited use 
the information was put to in Smith.126 Although these factors most directly relate to whether the 
purported search is reasonable and not whether the information is protected, they are important 
to consider in an overall factual inquiry.127 The information that can be gleaned from mass data 
collection is qualitatively different than individualized data collection because of the connections 
that can be drawn between the records of different people.128  
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 2. Internet metadata 
 The courts in the two cases above considered mainly the NSA telephone data collection 
programs,129 but some conclusions can be drawn regarding internet metadata as well. Internet 
metadata can also be considered to be “voluntarily” revealed to a third party, but it can be 
incredibly more revealing than phone metadata. Instead of just the numbers dialed and length of 
the call, internet metadata reveals the interactions we have with the internet and the information 
that can be accessed by it.130 Even though the information revealed is exponentially more 
revealing about us, the basics are the same as with the phone metadata: when writing an email, 
we enter information that a third party, our communications company, sends to a server to be 
processed so that we can visit the web page we are seeking to visit.131  
 Unlike our telephone use, our internet use is regularly tracked for the use of private 
companies, which use the information to target advertisements that often seem to follow us 
around to different web sites.132 Web sites track user’s web information by the use of a cookie, a 
small piece of code that is downloaded onto one’s browser when one visits a website.133 This 
information is used to remember you, as the unique user, when you return to the web site, and 
used to track your movements throughout the site.134 It is also regularly shared with data brokers 
and other outside parties and subsequently sold to marketing companies in order to target 
advertising to individual consumers.135  
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 This tracking, although it may be more extensive than most people think, is common 
knowledge, so it would seem that no expectations of privacy on the internet could be reasonable, 
except perhaps when under special secure types of connections.136 The disclosure of our Internet 
history is also voluntary in a strict sense – it is possible to opt out of these tracking devices to 
various degrees, and it is also possible to avoid behavioral tracking altogether by not using the 
Internet.137 Katz and the third party doctrine would therefore seem to prevent this information 
from being protected under the Fourth Amendment.  
IV. STARTING OVER: ELIMINATING KATZ FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
 The NSA leaks have made clear that the American government is watching and listening 
closely.138 Considering the extent to which Americans rely on electronic communications to 
complete daily tasks and the dragnet nature of the NSA data collection, few expectations of 
privacy can be reasonable.139 Since the bell of secret government data collection cannot be 
unrung, the Fourth Amendment test should shift from one based on subjective expectations of 
privacy to a factual analysis of the purported search, including the way in which the information 
may have been disclosed and for what purpose.140 
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A. Katz No Longer Effectively Protects Privacy Interests Because Few Expectations of Privacy 
Can Be Reasonable 
 Katz’s continued usefulness is questionable in light of the fundamental societal changes 
in the last two decades.141 In 2013, ninety-five percent of Americans under 45 and ninety-one 
percent of all Americans owned a cell phone;142 many of those cell phones are smartphones that 
constantly transmit a vast array of information to third parties.143 Revealing a great amount of 
personal information to take part in “mundane tasks” has become part of everyday life for most 
people.144 One must go to great lengths and spend a great deal of time and money to avoid being 
tracked by private companies throughout daily life.145 As it becomes more difficult to keep 
private information from private companies, a general sense of hopelessness prevails146 and 
societal expectations of privacy become eroded.147 Although some believe that these 
technologies actually increase expectations of privacy,148 others, including Justice Alito, have 
opined that they result in an “inevitable” diminution in privacy.149 
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 Scholars were suggesting that the Katz test was a failure long before the NSA revelations 
began.150 One scholar described the court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as “focusing too 
much on the secrecy of information and failing to account for the fact that in today's Information 
Age, so little of our data is secret.”151 A 1993 empirical study confirmed that the Supreme 
Court’s conception of reasonable expectations of privacy do not line up with the expectations of 
the American people.152 This study predates widespread use of the internet, data tracking, and 
mobile phones, so it is likely that societal expectations of privacy have changed a great deal 
since then.153  
 President Obama recently said that “there is a process that is taking place where we have 
to win back the trust, not just of governments, but more importantly of ordinary citizens, and that 
is not going to happen overnight.”154 The Katz test is circular because it depends on subjective 
expectations of privacy.155 If the people’s right is continuously violated by, for example, the 
NSA violating court orders by querying databases without justification,156 their expectations 
become less and less reasonable. The NSA leaks, in addition to putting debate about privacy in 
the forefront, also shook the American people’s faith in their government.157 Americans are 
already being tracked by private companies almost every minute of the day, but now they know 
that at least some of this information is being handed over to the government and subsequently 
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stored for years.158 The combination of private data tracking and government cooperation with 
those companies seriously erodes any reasonableness of Americans’ expectations of privacy that 
might have been left. 
B. Information Transmitted Through Electronic Communications Should Be Protected 
	   The character of the information collected and stored through phone and internet 
metadata can be incredibly revealing.159 Phone metadata can reveal religious and political 
associations and contact with health providers.160 More importantly, internet metadata can build 
an incredibly detailed picture of a person’s thoughts and curiosities, health problems, and family 
situation, among countless other bits and pieces of personal information.161 Under Katz and the 
third party doctrine, this information is revealed to third parties, so there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, so the information is not protected.162 This result means that a huge 
amount of personal information is not protected under the Fourth Amendment, a result which, 
judging by the public outcry resulting from the revelation of the NSA surveillance programs,163 
is not acceptable to American society.  
 It is scarcely imaginable that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment could have intended 
that such a wealth of personal details, regardless of their method of transmission, would be 
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without protection from government intrusion.164 Justice Brandeis predicted in his Olmstead 
dissent that “Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to 
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”165 That day has come because of 
the Internet.166 
 Several bases for the protection of electronic communications, particularly on the 
internet, have been proposed.167 One scholar has suggested that social network communications 
should be protected under the umbrella of interpersonal privacy, which has been recognized and 
granted protection in the Court’s substantive due process decisions.168 Another has suggested 
that the two forms of privacy protections are intertwined, especially when it comes to 
technology, because an internet user should have interpersonal privacy freedom of choice when 
making decisions on what parts of the internet to access, which is partially dependent on the 
knowledge that their actions are not being followed.169  
C. A New Approach to the Fourth Amendment: Factual Analysis 
 If Katz is no longer viable as a test that adequately protects rights under the Fourth 
Amendment,170 a new test must be fashioned, one that takes into account the massive 
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technological changes of the past few decades. One commentator has suggested that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test should be replaced with a test that protects information 
when the government collection of that information would present “problems of reasonable 
significance,” whether people expect the information to be private or not.171 These problems of 
reasonable significance include burdens on free speech, free association, lack of accountability, 
or lack of police discretion.172 The basic premise of this approach is practical, but there should be 
some relationship to the reality of how information is shared. If the test calls for the government 
being prohibited from collecting truly public information, the test would be unworkable. 
 Another scholar has suggested that, in lieu of the Katz reasonable expectations test, the 
Court instead endorse a fact-intensive inquiry of whether the information gained by the 
government was actually private as a matter of fact and law combined, as the Court actually did 
in Katz when it considered the character of the telephone booth conversation.173 The author gives 
the example of a pill in a man’s coat pocket, which will remain hidden unless someone commits 
a battery.174 This approach is useful and can simplify the confusing law in the area, even if it 
does require a more fact-intensive inquiry than the Katz test.175 In order for this test to offer 
meaningful Fourth Amendment protection, the third party doctrine must be abolished and digital 
privacy laws must be strengthened. 
 To make the factual approach workable in the context of electronic communications, 
another question must be asked in order to protect data: If the information was not in fact private, 
to whom was the information transmitted and for what purpose? A distinction should be drawn 
between information purposely, as opposed to voluntarily, disclosed to third parties and 
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information voluntarily disclosed to third parties for a limited purpose, namely transmitting the 
information or another purely administrative purpose. One scholar suggested that courts should 
recognize a concept of “shared privacy,” in which they recognize that some information is 
neither strictly private nor public, but held by third parties who are expected to keep the 
information.176 If courts consider this concept as one component of a factual approach, 
particularly when looking at electronic communications, the people would enjoy greater 
protection of electronic communications that are held by technology companies. 
 As suggested by Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Jones, the third-party doctrine 
should be abolished, at very least where technological devices are concerned.177 Privacy is not 
equal to secrecy today.178 One scholar noted that with the advent of cloud computing, in which 
users store data on remote servers managed by a third party, basically all files have been sent to a 
third party voluntarily.179 The Court presented dual rationales for the third-party doctrine in 
Smith, both that the numbers are voluntarily revealed to the phone company and that the content 
of the communication was not revealed with the use of the pen register.180 The distinction 
between content and non-content information breaks down in the context of internet metadata, 
when the pages visited can reveal a great deal of content, not just logistical information.181 
Further, many courts applying the test consider only what information is revealed, not how the 
information is used, which runs contrary to the suggested part of the factual inquiry above.182 
The revelation of the metadata that occurs when an email is sent is very different from the 
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revelation of information that occurs when someone publishes something on a social networking 
site, and should be treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes.183 
 The other question raised by the continued use of the third-party doctrine is what 
constitutes a voluntary disclosure when data tracking is as pervasive as it is. In one recent 
example, a reporter spent two years trying to keep as much of her personal data from others as 
she could and still take advantage of modern conveniences.184 Even though she went to great 
lengths and incurred many inconveniences on this endeavor, the author estimated that she 
blocked about 50 percent of the data available about her.185 The third party doctrine eviscerates 
the Fourth Amendment when applied to electronic communications because in order to keep 
personal communications protected, one must opt out of taking advantage of modern 
conveniences. 
In the context of Katz, much of the data revealed to third parties by phone and internet use is 
shared and used – mostly not by the government but by private parties looking to target 
marketing to the tastes of the individual consumer.186   
 Because of the problems with less-than-voluntary data revelations, stronger privacy laws 
regarding electronic communications will be necessary for the factual inquiry to effectively 
protect privacy interests.187 The pushback from dragnet data collection has already begun, so it is 
not outlandish to think that these strengthened privacy laws are on the horizon.188 For example, 
the Federal Trade Commission has proposed a national Do Not Track list to allow Internet users 
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to opt out of data tracking,189 and a non-governmental group has established a Do Not Track 
code that some companies have pledged to honor.190 These laws will help ensure that data 
subject to “shared privacy” remains free from disclosure to the public at large.  
  1. Phone Metadata 
 When it comes to the mass data collection undertaken by the NSA, the factual approach 
would help protect some of the information collected. Phone records are generally accessible to 
three parties: the caller, the receiver of the call, and the phone company.191 The phone company 
has the information in order to connect the call and bill the customer for his or her usage.192 
Otherwise, the information is kept private and is not generally accessible to the public.193 Since 
the purpose for which the phone company has the information is limited and the disclosure is 
ordinarily limited to the phone company and not to other parties, this information should be 
protected as subject to share privacy.194 This approach would, of course, require reversal of 
Smith and the third party doctrine as well as Katz. It would restore a more basic measure of 
privacy considering the ubiquity of cell phones and other electronic communications devices in 
today’s society.195  
  2. Internet Metadata 
 When it comes to internet metadata, the application of the factual inquiry becomes 
slightly more complex. Internet metadata is accessible to the internet service provider, but other 
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information is easily collected through the use of cookies.196 The information gathered can then 
be collected and sold to a third party.197 The collected information, however, is not then 
accessible to the general public, but made available for sale as a package, aggregated with the 
data of many other individuals.198 Because of all this tracking, it is hard to say that internet 
metadata is actually private under a factual inquiry, but it is also hard to say that it is entirely 
public. People cannot just go get the data that has been aggregated on themselves, or another 
person: the companies hold the information closely, and much of it is not personally identifiable 
without piecing together the information.199 The question of the actual privacy of internet 
tracking is still in flux, especially because of the rapid changes in technology.200 The data would 
likely fit into the “shared privacy” concept in which a third party holds the information but 
generally cannot disseminate it to the general public.201 A strengthening of internet privacy laws 
would greater ensure that the third parties can only share the information within certain bounds 
and help ensure that the information does not become generally available to the public. Either 
way, the actual privacy of internet activity is still a better yardstick than the expectations of 
privacy, which have been thrown into a tailspin by the NSA revelations. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Using a factual inquiry is of course only a start to reinvigorating the Fourth Amendment 
in the technological age. Legislation has been introduced to regulate the manner in which private 
data brokers use consumer information,202 which could potentially enhance the actual privacy of 
information over the phone and internet, which in turn would enhance Fourth Amendment 
protections. Eliminating the subjection, expectation-based Katz test and the third-party doctrine 
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